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CRIMINAL LAW-UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINESS-CAREER
OFFENDER STATUS-DEFINING A "CRIME OF VIOLENCE"-The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that in deter-
mining whether a prior crime qualified as a "crime of violence" for
sentencing purposes under the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines, a sentencing court could inquire into the conduct underlying
the prior offense to ascertain whether the conduct presented a "se-
rious potential risk of harm to another."
United States v John, 936 F2d 764 (3d Cir 1991).
In United States v John,1 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit addressed the question of whether, in deter-
mining the existence vel non 2 of a "crime of violence"3 as a predi-
cate to career offender status for sentencing purposes under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter "Guidelines"),4 a
sentencing court could inquire into the actual facts underlying a
prior conviction.5 Alternatively, the court considered whether a
sentencing court was limited to an examination of the statutory
elements of a prior offense without reference to the actual actions
taken by the defendant in perpetration of the crime,'
Under Section 4B1.1 of the Guidelines, a defendant over the age
of eighteen, convicted of a felony that is either a "crime of vio-
lence"'7 or a "controlled substance offense," is subject to sentenc-
1. 936 F2d 764 (3d Cir 1991).
2. "Vel non" is defined as "whether or not-used to express a legal situation where
something must be done or a given determination must be made or not with no third alter-
native." Webster's Third International Dictionary 2529 (Merriam-Webster, 1986).
3. A "crime of violence" is defined in Section 4B1.2(1) of the Guidelines as:
Any offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term ex-
ceeding one year that-(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a dwelling,
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
United States Sentencing Guidelines, § 4B1.2 (effective November 1, 1987), codified at 18
USCA App (West, 1989) (hereinafter "Guidelines").
4. Guidelines, § 4B1.1.
5. John, 936 F2d at 765.
6. Id.
7. See note 3.
8. A "controlled substance offense" is defined in Section 4B1.2 as:
[A]n offense under a federal or state law prohibiting the manufacture, import, export,
or distribution of a controlled substance offense (or a counterfeit substance) or the
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ing as a career offender if he had at least two prior felony convic-
tions that qualify under either of these two categories., A "crime of
violence" is defined in Section 4B1.2(1) of the Guidelines as any
offense, under federal or state law punishable by incarceration for
more than one year, which: (1) has as an element of the offense
"the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another," 10 (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, extor-
tion, or involves the use of explosives,1 or (3) otherwise involves
conduct by the defendant which "presents a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another."' 2
In John, the defendant, Keithroy John, was convicted in the
District Court of the Virgin Islands of possession of crack cocaine
with the intent to distribute. 3 Having been previously convicted of
two felonies, assault in the third degree 4 and grand larceny,15
possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manu-
facture, import, export, or distribute.
Guidelines, § 4B1.2.
9. John, 936 F2d at 765; Guidelines, § 4B1.1.
10. John, 936 F2d at 767; Guidelines, § 4B1.2(1).
11. Guidelines, § 4B1.2(l).
12. Id.
13. John, 936 F2d at 765. Possession of crack with the intent to distribute is a viola-
tion of 21 USC § 841(a)(1) (West 1981). Id.
14. § 297. Assault in the Third Degree
Whoever, under circumstances not amounting to an assault in the first or second
degree-
(1) assaults another person with intent to commit a felony;
(2) assaults another with a deadly weapon;
(3) assaults another with premeditated design and by use of means calculated to
inflict great bodily harm;
(4) assaults another and inflicts serious bodily injury upon the person assaulted; or
whoever under any circumstances;
(5) assaults a peace officer in the lawful discharge of the duties of his office with a
weapon of any kind, if it was known or declared to the defendant that the person
assaulted was a peace officer discharging an official duty-
shall be fined not less than $500 and not more than $3,000 or imprisoned not more
than 5 years or both.
14 VI Code Ann § 297 (1991 Supp).
15. § 1081. Larceny defined and classified
(a) Larceny is the unlawful taking, stealing, carrying, leading, or driving away the
personal property of another.
(b) Larceny is divided in two degrees, grand larceny and petit larceny.
14 VI Code Ann § 1081 (1964 & 1991 Supp).
§ 1083. Grand larceny
Whoever takes property-
(1) which is of $100 or more in value; or
(2) from the person of another-commits grand larceny and shall be imprisoned for
not more than ten years.
14 VI Code Ann § 1083 (1964 & 1991 Supp).
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under Virgin Islands criminal statutes, the critical issue at John's
sentencing hearing was whether, under the Guidelines, John
should have been sentenced as a career offender.16 More specifi-
cally, the issue turned upon whether John's prior grand larceny
conviction qualified as a "crime of violence" under the
Guidelines.17
The district court held that John's grand larceny conviction
qualified as a "crime of violence" for sentencing purposes under
the Guidelines.18 This determination was founded upon the court's
findings that: (1) larceny had been listed among those crimes enu-
merated as a "crime of violence" under the Control, Firearms, and
Ammunition Chapter of Title 23 of the Virgin Islands Code19 and
16. John, 936 F2d at 765. Offenders are sentenced based upon an offense level and a
criminal history category. For each statutorily defined offense, the Guidelines assign an of-
fense level. The levels, contained in Chapter Two of the Guidelines, range from one to forty-
three. Guidelines, Chapter 2. "Criminal history category" is defined in § 4A1.1 as:
The total points from items (a) through (e) determine the criminal history category
in the Sentencing Table in Chapter 5, Part A.
(a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one
month.
(b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days not
counted in (a).
(c) Add 1 point for each prior sentence not included in (a) or (b), up to a total of 4
points for this item.
(d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any
criminal justice system, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprison-
ment, work release, or escape status.
(e) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense less than two years
after release from imprisonment on a sentence counted under (a) or (b) or while in
imprisonment or escape status on such a sentence. If 2 points are added for item (d),
add only 1 point for this item.
Guidelines, § 4AL.1. Consequently, if the sentencing court determined that John was not a
career offender, then under Chapter 5 Part A of the Guidelines he would have been sen-
tenced within a Guidelines sentencing range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months based on
an offense level of twenty-two and a criminal history category of IV. Conversely, if John was
determined to be a career offender, then under Chapter 5 Part A of the Guidelines he would
be sentenced within a Guidelines sentencing range of 210 to 262 months on the basis of an
offense level of thirty-two and a criminal history category of VI. John, 936 F2d at 765-66.
Under § 4B1.1, a career offender's criminal history category will always be Category VI.
Guidelines, § 4B1.1.
17. John, 936 F2d at 765. John conceded that his prior assault conviction qualified
under the Guidelines as a "crime of violence." Id. Presumably, John agreed that his assault
conviction was a "crime of violence" because assault has as an element of the offense the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. See
note 3.
18. John, 936 F2d at 766. The district court's opinion in this case was not published.
19. Id. The Control, Firearms, and Ammunition Chapter of Title 23 of the Virgin
Islands Code defines "crime of violence" as:
The crime of, or the attempt to commit murder, in any degree, voluntary manslaugh-
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(2) the description set forth in the presentence investigation re-
port 20 of John's background indicated that the grand larceny con-
viction qualified as a "crime of violence" under Section 4B1.2(1) of
the Guidelines because weapons had been involved in perpetrating
the crime."' Consequently, John was sentenced as a career offender
to 210 months imprisonment.22
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, John's main argument was that the district court erred in:
(1) relying upon the Virgin Islands Code's definition of grand lar-
ceny, and (2) looking at John's actual conduct during the prior
crime to determine whether the crime involved violence.2 John
contended that in determining whether the grand larceny crime
was a "crime of violence," the sentencing court's inquiry should
have been limited to the statutory elements of the grand larceny
offense, which did not include violence as a necessary element of
the crime.24
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of sen-
tence.25 The court held that in determining whether a prior crime
ter, rape, arson, mayhem, kidnapping, assault in the first degree, assault in the second
degree, assault in the third degree, robbery, burglary, unlawful entry or larceny.
23 VI Code Ann § 451(e) (1990).
20. § 3552. Presentence Reports
(a) Presentence investigation and report by probation officer.-A United States probation
officer shall make a presentence investigation of a defendant that is required pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and shall, before
the imposition of sentence, report the results of the investigation to the court.
(d) Disclosure of present reports.-The Court shall assure that a report filed pursuant to
this section is disclosed to the defendant, the counsel for the defendant, and the attorney
for the Government at least ten days prior to the date set for sentencing, unless this mini-
mum period is waived by the defendant.
18 USC § 3552 (1986).
21. John, 936 F2d at 766. The pre-sentence investigation report, which was examined
by the sentencing court as part of the record, described John's underlying conduct in the
crime: "The defendant, in concert with two co-defendants, entered a home and threatened
the occupants with guns. Cash and other personal property was [sic] taken." Id. John had
admitted at the sentencing hearing that the pre-sentence investigation report was accurate
in every respect. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id at 767.
24. Id. The Court defined the Virgin Islands statutes under which John was con-
victed of grand larceny, as "the unlawful taking . . . [of] the personal property of another
. ..of $100.00 or more in value." 14 VI Code Ann §§ 1081, 1083 (1964). John, 936 F2d at
766. John's contention was based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v
United States, 495 US 575 (1990). For further discussion of Taylor, see notes 41, 173-90 and
accompanying text.
25. John, 936 F2d at 765.
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qualified as a "crime of violence" for sentencing purposes under
the Guidelines, a sentencing court could inquire into the conduct
underlying the prior offense to ascertain whether the conduct
presented "a serious potential risk of harm to another. ' 26 The
court also concluded that how a state defined a "crime of violence"
in its criminal code was irrelevant to a federal court's determina-
tion of whether a prior crime qualified as a "crime of violence" for
sentencing purposes.2 7
In concluding that a defendant's conduct in a prior offense could
be examined to determine if the crime qualified as a "crime of vio-
lence" under the Guidelines, the Third Circuit inferred legislative
intent.2" The court reasoned that, based upon the definition of
"crime of violence" in Section 4B1.2(1) of the Guidelines2" and the
explanation of the definition in Application Note 2 to that Sec-
tion,30 the United States Sentencing Commission (hereinafter
"Sentencing Commission"), 1 in enacting the Guidelines, had envi-
sioned three independent ways by which a prior felony conviction
was to be considered a "crime of violence" for sentencing pur-
poses. 3 2 According to the court, a prior conviction qualified as a
"crime of violence" under the Guidelines if: (1) the prior convic-
tion was for a crime specifically enumerated in Section 4B1.2(1)'s
definition of "crimes of violence" (for example, murder and man-
slaughter), (2) the prior conviction was for a crime that, although
26. Id at 770.
27. Id at 770-71 n 4. The Third Circuit agreed with John's contention that the dis-
trict court had erred in relying upon the Virgin Islands Code's definition of grand larceny as
a "crime of violence," concluding that state and territorial definitions of which crimes quali-
fied as "crimes of violence" were irrelevant to the issue. Rather, under the Guidelines, the
determination of whether a prior crime was a "crime of violence" turned solely on those
factors specifically listed in Section 4B1.2(1) of the Guidelines. Id.
28. Id at 767.
29. Id. See note 3.
30. John, 936 F2d at 767. Application Notes 1 and 2 read:
1. The terms "crime of violence" and "controlled substance offense" include the of-
fenses of aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and attempting to commit such offenses.
2. "Crime of violence" includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated as-
sault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit,
and burglary of a dwelling. Other offenses are included where (A) that offense has as
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth in the count of which the defendant
was convicted involves use of explosives or, by its nature, presented a serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another.
Guidelines, § 4B1.2 commentary.
31. For further discussion of the United States Sentencing Commission, see notes
130-32 and accompanying text.
32. John, 936 F2d at 767.
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not specifically enumerated in Section 4B1.2(1), had as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, or (3)
the prior conviction was for a crime which was neither specifically
enumerated nor involved physical force as an element of the of-
fense, but which involved conduct posing a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another. 3 Consequently, the court interpreted
the third category of Section 4B1.2(1) as permitting the district
court to examine John's actual conduct during the grand larceny
offense to determine if the offense constituted a "crime of
violence."34
In so holding, the Third Circuit stated that its conclusion and
reasoning were consistent with its decision in United States v Wil-
liamss5 and unaffected by its decision in United States v McAl-
lister.3 In Williams, the court had interpreted an earlier version of
Section 4131.2 to permit a sentencing court to examine a defend-
ant's underlying conduct in a prior crime to determine whether the
prior conviction qualified as a "crime of violence" under the
Guidelines.3 7 In McAllister, a case involving a burglary conviction,
an offense specifically enumerated as a "crime of violence" under
Section 4131.2, the Third Circuit had held that where the prior
crime was one enumerated under the Guidelines as a "crime of vio-
lence," an examination of the underlying facts of the crime was
inappropriate.3 8 Under such circumstances, the court, in McAl-
lister, concluded the sentencing court was to take a categorical ap-
proach.39 The court, in John, further stated that its conclusion was




34. Id at 767-68.
35. 892 F2d 296 (3d Cir 1989), cert denied, US , 110 S Ct 3221 (1990). Williams
was decided by reference to the text of Section 4B1.2 and the Application Note to the sec-
tion as they existed prior to an amendment of Section 4B1.2 that became effective Novem-
ber 1, 1989. For further discussion of Williams, see notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
36. 927 F2d 136 (3d Cir 1991). For further discussion of McAllister, see notes 162-71
and accompanying text.
37. John, 936 F2d at 768, citing Williams, 892 F2d at 304.
38. John, 936 F2d at 770. See note 30 for the language of Application Note 2. See
also, in accord, United States v Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F2d 542, 547-48 (11th Cir 1990);
United States v Brunson, 907 F2d 117, 120-21 (10th Cir 1990).
39. John, 936 F2d at 770.
40. Id at 768. See United States v Goodman, 914 F2d 696, 699 (5th Cir 1990); United
States v Terry, 900 F2d 1039, 1041-43 (7th Cir 1990); United States v Baskin, 886 F2d 383,
389 (DC Cir 1989), cert denied, 494 US 1089 (1990). For discussion of a case that reached a
contrary conclusion, see United States v Walker, 930 F2d 789 (10th Cir 1991), discussed at
notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
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The Third Circuit also concluded that John had incorrectly in-
terpreted the United States Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Tay-
lor v United States.4 1 John had argued that under Taylor a sen-
tencing court was restricted solely to examining the statutory
elements of a prior offense when determining whether the offense
constituted a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines.42 To the
contrary, the court, in John, read Taylor as supporting the view
that a sentencing court could examine a defendant's underlying
conduct in a prior crime to determine whether that conduct posed
a sufficient risk of physical injury to another, thus qualifying the
offense as a "crime of violence" for sentencing purposes. 3 The
Third Circuit interpreted Taylor as concluding that a sentencing
court was limited solely to looking at the statutory elements of the
prior offense, without examination of the particular underlying
facts of the crime, only when the predicate conviction being ex-
amined was one of the enumerated offenses listed in Section
4B1.2(1)'s definition of "crime of violence.
44
John also argued in his appeal that the district court had erred
when it failed to declare a mistrial in conjunction with the testi-
mony of a Mr. Didier, the alleged buyer of the crack.45 Prior to
Didier's testimony, the Government had suggested that Didier be
advised of his rights and furnished with an attorney because he
had also been arrested during the alleged drug transaction and was
facing charges in the Virgin Islands Territorial Court.48 This sug-
gestion was made in proceedings outside of the jury's hearing.
The defense agreed and Didier was advised of his rights and coun-
sel was appointed to represent him.4 8 Didier subsequently testified
that no drug transaction had taken place between John and
41. 495 US 575 (1990). In Taylor, the Supreme Court examined whether a prior bur-
glary conviction qualified as a "violent crime" under the sentencing enhancement provision
of the Armed Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, 18 USCA § 924(e) (West 1991
Supp), a provision which contained language analogous to that of section 4B1.2. For further
discussion of Taylor, see notes 173-90 and accompanying text.
42. John, 936 F2d at 768.
43. Id at 769.
44. Id at 769-70. For example, a sentencing court would be limited solely to looking
at the statutory elements of a crime when the prior conviction being examined was a bur-
glary. Id.
45. Id at 766 n 2. When Didier had originally been questioned by the Narcotics
Strike Force agents about his encounter with John, he had denied that he and John had







After Didier testified, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, al-
leging that the Government had suggested Didier be advised of his
rights and have counsel appointed to represent him in order to in-
timidate Didier prior to his testifying.50 The district court denied
the motion.51 The Third Circuit, in a footnote to the case, affirmed
the trial court's decision upon the ground that, because John had
consented to the government's suggestion, he could not now com-
plain about the ruling.
52
In the same footnote, the Third Circuit also dismissed John's
argument that the finding of career offender status violated his
Fifth53 and Eighth Amendment 4 rights under the United States
Constitution.5 John had contended that, because of the fifteen-
year lapse between his grand larceny conviction and the instant
offense and his youth at the time of the grand larceny offense, the
sentence imposed on him as a career offender rose to an unconsti-
tutional level of severity. 6
Concerning John's Fifth Amendment claim, the Third Circuit
held that John had not been denied due process. 7 In so holding,
the court first stated that Section 4B1.1 implemented Congress'
mandate to the Sentencing Commission to assure that career of-
fenders received a sentence of incarceration at or near the maxi-
mum term authorized by statute,58 and John's sentence was two
years short of the statutory maximum.59 Secondly, the court con-
cluded that the Guidelines were constitutional because the career
offender legislative scheme bore a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate governmental purpose, namely to prevent recidivist offenders





53. The text of the Fifth Amendment pertinent to John's claim of constitutional vio-
lation reads, "No person . . . shall . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." US Const, Amend V.
54. The text of the Eighth Amendment reads, "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." US Const,
Amend VIII.
55. John, 936 F2d at 766 n 2.
56. Id. John was sixteen at the time he was convicted of grand larceny. Id.
57. Id.
58. 28 USC § 994(h) (1984).
59. John, 936 F2d at 766-67.
60. Id at 767.
Vol. 30:10531060
1992 Recent Decisions 1061
that similar legislative schemes had survived due process
challenges.
61
John's Eighth Amendment argument was summarily- dismissed
by the Third Circuit.6 2 The court simply concluded that John's
sentence was not nearly as severe as other sentences that had sur-
vived Eighth Amendment challenges. 3
Throughout the history of criminal law, four general purposes
for sentencing offenders have existed: (1) retributive punishment, 4
(2) deterrence, 5 (3) incapacitation, 6 and (4) rehabilitation.7
These purposes have been assigned different degrees of priority
under the law, depending upon the particular philosophy and be-
liefs of a given era.6 For example, under the current federal sen-
tencing guidelines, the purposes for sentencing offenders are pri-
marily to punish, deter, and incapacitate the criminal6 rather than
61. Id. See, for example, United States v Hawkins, 811 F2d 210, 217 (3d Cir 1987)
(the sentencing enhancement scheme in the Armed Forces Criminal amendment to 18 USC
App § 1202(a) was upheld as constitutional), and United States v Frank, 864 F2d 992, 1009-
10 (3d Cir 1988) (court held that a defendant does not have a substantive due process right
to individualized treatment in sentencing). John, 936 F2d at 767.
62. John, 936 F2d at 767.
63. Id. In support of its holding, the Court cited Rummell v Estelle, 445 US 263
(1980). In Rummell, the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory life sentence where the defend-
ant, previously convicted of two similar minor felonies, had been convicted of obtaining
$120.75 by false pretenses. Rummell, 445 US 263 (1980).
64. "Retribution" is defined as "something given or demanded in payment. In crimi-
nal law, it is punishment based on the theory which bears it name and based strictly on the
fact that every crime demands payment in the form of punishment." Black's Law Diction-
ary 1184 (West, 5th ed 1979).
65. "Deterrence" is defined as "the restraint and discouragement of crime by fear (as
by the exemplary punishment of convicted offenders)." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 617 (Merriam-Webster, 1986).
66. "Incapacitation" is defined as "the act of incapacitating or state of being incapac-
itated." Webster's Third International Dictionary 1141 (Merriam-Webster, 1986).
67. "Rehabilitation" is defined as "investing or clothing again with some right, au-
thority, or dignity. Restoring to a former capacity; reinstating; qualifying again." Black's
Law Dictionary 1157 (West, 5th ed 1979). Concerning the sentencing of criminals, the object
of rehabilitation is to "return the offender to the community as a law abiding citizen." Ilene
H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80
J Crim L & Criminol 883, 886 (1990). Professor Nagel is a member of the United States
Sentencing Commission. For further discussion of the four general purposes for sentencing
offenders, see Nagel, 80 J Crim L & Criminol at 887 (cited within this note).
68. Charles J Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 101 Harv L Rev 1938, 1940-41 (1988).
69. In 18 USC § 3553(a)(2), Congress mandated that in determining the particular
sentence to be imposed, a court should consider:
(2) the need of the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
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to rehabilitate him into a law-abiding citizen.7 0 Similarly, depend-
ing upon which purpose for sentencing criminal offenders is domi-
nant at the time, varying degrees of judicial discretion71 in as-
signing punishment are incorporated into the sentencing system.
7
1
For example, when retributive punishment is the dominant objec-
tive, judicial discretion is generally limited.73 Conversely, when re-
habilitation is the prevalent purpose for sentencing, judicial discre-
tion is more broad.74
The sentencing of criminal offenders can be traced back as far as
Mosaic times.75 Under Mosaic law, the criminal justice system was
founded upon canon law, thus embodying a strict code of behav-
ior.76 Consequently, officials, when sentencing criminals, focused on
retributive punishment 77 primarily through the use of summary
capital punishment.78 The crimes and their corresponding punish-
ments were documented and there was little judicial discretion in
sentencing."
As the centuries progressed and centralized government rose in
Europe, incomplete penal codes increasingly placed the power to
determine sentences into the hands of judges.8 0 Provided with little
direction, judges began to exercise broad discretion in determining
the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within the limits
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
18 USC § 3553(a)(2) (1989).
70. 28 USC § 994(k) reads, "The [United States Sentencing] Commission shall insure
that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of impris-
onment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant. . . ." 28 USC § 994(k) (1989).
71. "Discretion" is defined as "the power of free decision or latitude of choice within
certain legal bounds." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 362 (Merriam-Webster, 9th ed
1983).
72. Nagel, 80 J Crim L & Criminol at 887 (cited in note 67).
73. Id.
74. Id at 885-86, 893-94.
75. Id at 887.
76. Id.
77. Id. Retributive punishment continued to remain the dominant objective of crimi-
nal sentencing throughout the early criminal law history. Id at 888-90. However, this was
not always the primary purpose; Roman criminal law's focus was primarily on deterrence. Id
at 888.
78. Id at 887. The use of capital punishment was generally the primary method of
punishment under the common law, regardless of the crime, until the nineteenth century.
William Kuntz, Criminal Sentencing in Three Nineteenth-Century Cities: A Social History
of Punishment in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia 10 (Garland Publishing, 1988).
79. Nagel, 80 J Crim L & Criminol at 887-88 (cited in note 67).
80. Id at 889.
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fixed by law."1 This discretion led to disparities in sentencing and
general discrimination; individuals with common criminal back-
grounds who were convicted of similar offenses often received
vastly varied sentences.8 2
The eighteenth century, the era of the Enlightenment and the
Age of Reason, brought new theories concerning man and society
to the forefront of academic thought.8 In the area of criminal law,
these theories spawned a number of critics of the existing criminal
justice system and its discretionary sentencing practice.s4 While
these critics ultimately were unsuccessful in changing their crimi-
nal system, their theories provided the groundwork for those who,
in the nineteenth century, successfully reformed the existing crimi-
nal justice system, including its sentencing policies.85
During the infancy of the United States, the country's federal
and state governments generally followed in the steps of the En-
glish common law.' Accordingly, in the area of criminal law, re-
tributive punishment was the dominant purpose of sentencing with
crimes and their punishments being codified in penal statutes.
8 7
Theoretically, the statutes were designed to provide for a determi-
nate sentencing system whereby the maximum sentence was lim-
ited and the judge exercised little discretion when imposing sen-
tence.88 Realistically, however, judges in fact exercised considerable
discretion and consequently, significant disparities prevailed be-
81. Id.
82. For example, under the common law the clergy and nobility generally were not
subject to the same punishments as the rest of the populace. Id.
83. Id at 890.
84. Id. Prevailing amongst these critics was Cesare Beccaria, a pioneer of many of the
concepts used in the criminal justice system of today. In his famous work, On Crimes and
Punishments (1764), Beccaria asserted, inter aia, the following reforms for sentencing crim-
inal offenders: (1) the establishment of legislatively, versus judicially, determined sentences,
(2) codification of criminal laws, (3) the elimination of torture and (4) the abolishment of
capital punishment, with imprisonment invoked in its place. While Beccaria's work was
heavily criticized by the ruling powers and the courts of the time, his ideas had far-reaching
significance. They were utilized by philosophers of the latter eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, men such as John Howard, Jeremy Bentham and Samuel Rommilly. These philoso-
phers and writers developed the theoretical basis of "classical criminology," a school of
thought which stresses deterrence as its primary goal and emphasizes equality and certainty
of punishment as the means to achieve the goal. Id at 891.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id at 892. Generally, capital and corporal punishment were the norm. Id.
88. Id. Some state penal codes (for example, New York) limited the range of available
punishments more narrowly than other state codes (for example, Pennsylvania). Kuntz,
Criminal Sentencing in Three Nineteenth-Century Cities at 43 (cited in note 78).
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tween the sentences imposed and the sentences actually served.89
Between 1865 and 1880, leading American penologists grew frus-
trated with the existing criminal sentencing system.90 These penol-
ogists, seeing that retribution generally was not a deterrent of
criminal activity, turned to a form of "classical criminology," the
school of thought espoused by the Enlightenment reformers a cen-
tury before."' They adopted the philosophy that criminals needed
to be incarcerated not merely to be punished, but more impor-
tantly, to become rehabilitated and understand the error of their
criminal ways.2
To achieve the rehabilitation of criminal offenders, the penolo-
gists determined that the court systems needed to implement an
indeterminate sentencing system9" in place of the established de-
terminate sentencing system.9 4 This was because, the reformers as-
serted, a system under which a criminal knew that after a period
he would certainly be freed provided no incentive for rehabilita-
tion.9 5 The penologists reasoned that this was especially true given
that, under the determinate sentencing system, chronic over-
crowding of prisons, standard use of commutation and good-time
laws, and frequent gubernatorial pardons often served to reduce
criminal sentences to minimal periods of incarceration.
6
By the turn of the century, legislatures across the country were
taking the reformers' findings seriously. By 1911, twenty-one
states had codified an indeterminate sentencing system into their
89. Id at 354, 456-64.
90. Nagel, 80 J Crim L & Criminol at 893 (cited in note 67).
91. See note 84 and accompanying text.
92. Nagel, 80 J Crim L & Criminol at 894. See note 84 and accompanying text.
93. Alan Dershowitz, the noted legal scholar, defined "the indeterminate sentence" as
"a continuum of devices designed to tailor punishment, particularly the duration of confine-
ment, to the rehabilitative needs and special dangers of the particular criminal (or more
realistically, the category of criminals)." Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement:
Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U Pa L Rev 297, 298 (1974).
94. Nagel, 80 J Crim L & Criminol at 893-94 (cited in note 67). The call for adoption
of an indeterminate sentencing system was first raised by the National Prison Association in
1870. Sandra Shane-DuBow, Alice P. Brown and Erik Olsen, Sentence Reform in the
United States 5 (Superintendent of Documents, United States Government Printing Office,
1985). The association, at its annual conference, proposed a system whereby prisoner
sentences would be limited only by satisfactory proof of rehabilitation and not by "mere
lapse of time." Shane-DuBow, Brown and Olsen, Sentence Reform in the United States at
5 (cited within this note).
95. Shane-Dubow, Brown and Olsen, Sentence Reform in the United States at 5
(cited in note 94).
96. Kuntz, Criminal Sentencing in Three Nineteenth-Century Cities at 457-58
(cited in note 78).
97. Nagel, 80 J Crim L & Criminol at 894 (cited in note 67).
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penal codes.98 The federal court system joined the movement to-
ward the indeterminate sentencing of criminals in 1910.19
Under the new federal sentencing system, 100 the discretion in
sentencing given to judges was almost boundless.101 The only limi-
tation upon federal judicial discretion was that the judge had to
stay within broad statutory parameters. 0 2 As long as the statutory
limit was maintained, the sentence was not reviewable by the ap-
pellate courts. 0 Moreover, the judge did not have to state the ba-
sis for his choice of punishment.
0 4
Williams v New York' 05 illustrates the extent of the discretion
available to judges under an indeterminate sentencing system. 08 In
Williams, the issue was whether a New York sentencing statute
10 7
98. Id.
99. Id. By the 1960s, indeterminate sentencing was the rule throughout the country.
Id. See also Shane-DuBow, Brown and Olsen, Sentence Reform in the United States at 6
(cited in note 94).
100. Under the federal indeterminate sentencing system, the judge imposed a sentence
chosen from a penalty range established by Congress. Then, after one-third of the imprison-
ment term had been served, a parole board determined what the prisoner's actual length of
imprisonment would be based on how long the board determined the prisoner's rehabilita-
tion would take. See generally 18 USC §§ 4163, 4164 and 4205, repealed by Pub L No 98-473
§ 218 (a)(4), (5), 98 Stat 3037 (1984). Theresa Walker Karle and Thomas Sager, Are the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: Empirical and Case Law
Analysis, 40 Emory L J 393 (1991).
101. Comment, Structuring Determinate Sentencing Guidelines: Difficult Choices for
the New Federal Sentencing Commission, 35 Cath L Rev 181, 182 n 6 (1985).
102. Comment, 35 Cath L Rev at 182 n 6 (cited in note 101). See also United States v
Tucker, 404 US 443, 446 (1972).
103. Karle and Sager, 40 Emory L J at 396 (cited in note 100).
104. Id.
105. 337 US 241 (1949). In Williams, the defendant had been convicted of murder in
the first degree for a homicide committed during a burglary. Williams, 337 US at 242. Given
the option of recommending the death penalty or life imprisonment, the jury had recom-
mended that Williams be sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. However, the trial judge im-
posed the death penalty based on information contained in a pre-sentence investigation re-
port. Id. The judge's examination of the report, which revealed personal information about
Williams, as well as his criminal history, was permitted under a New York criminal statute.
Id at 242-43.
106. Williams v New York is the seminal case in the area of sentencing disparity. It is
used both by the courts and legal scholars to illustrate the extent of sentencing disparity in
the federal and state court systems. See, for example North Carolina v Pierce, 395 US 711
(1969); Nagel, 80 J Crim L & Criminol at 895 (cited in note 67); and Ogletree, 101 Harv L
Rev at 1941-42 (cited in note 68).
107. Section 482 of the New York Criminal Code provided:
Before rendering judgment or pronouncing sentence the court shall cause the defend-
ant's previous criminal record to be submitted to it, including any reports that may
have been made as a result of a mental, phychiatric [sic] or physical examination of
such person, and may seek any information that will aid the court in determining the
proper treatment of such defendant.
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violated the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due pro-
cess. 10 8 The sentencing statute allowed the judge to examine facts
about the defendant's background that had not been introduced at
the trial, because of their irrelevancy to the issue of guilt and were
obtained from witnesses whom the defendant had not been permit-
ted to confront.10 9
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Jus-
tice Black, held that the New York statute did not violate the de-
fendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. 0 Justice
Black concluded that the right pertained solely to a defendant's
right to due process during trial and was inapplicable to a defend-
ant's subsequent treatment after conviction."' Thus, the Court
concluded, once conviction occurred, different evidentiary rules
applied." 2
In reaching its decision, the Court first reasoned that the New
York statute was constitutional based on history.1 3 The Court as-
serted that throughout American legal history, judges had been en-
titled to exercise their discretion in choosing the kind and extent
of punishment to be imposed as long as the penalty was within
statutory limits."" In Williams, the sentence was within the statu-
tory limits. 115
The Court further opined that there were practical reasons for
having different evidentiary rules governing trial and sentencing
procedures." 6 The Court explained that rules of evidence for trial
were designed narrowly to ensure that: (1) a time-consuming and
confusing trial of collateral issues did not occur, (2) a defendant
was only judged on the merits of the case, and (3) a jury was not
unduly influenced by a defendant's past criminal activity." 7 Con-
versely, the Court explained, a sentencing judge's job was to deter-
mine the type and extent of the punishment which was best for the
Williams, 337 US at 243.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id at 252.
111. Id at 251.
112. Id at 246.
113. Id.
114. Id. To illustrate, the Court compared the New York statute to then Rule 32 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 32 provided that federal judges could ex-
amine reports made by probation officers, which gave information about the defendant, as
an aid in imposing sentence. Id.
115. Id at 242 n 2.
116. Id at 246.
117. Id at 247.
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rehabilitation of the individual defendant.118 Therefore, to prop-
erly determine the necessary rehabilitation, a judge needed to have
access to a full range of information about the defendant.119
Justice Murphy wrote a dissenting opinion in Williams.120 He
agreed with the majority as to the importance of liberal use of pro-
bation reports.12" ' However, he reasoned that because: (1) the case
was a capital case, (2) the jury had unanimously recommended a
life sentence, (3) it was conceded that the probation report would
not have been admissible at the trial, and (4) the report was not
subject to examination by the defendant, William's Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process had been violated. 22
The view in Williams that judicial discretion in sentencing was
necessary and proper and that offenses should not be given a cate-
gorical punishment, remained the dominant opinion on the subject
in the United States until the late 1960s. At that time, legal re-
formers began to strongly critique the indeterminate sentencing
system, calling for a resurgence of the retributive justification of
punishment. 2  They claimed that the indeterminate sentencing
system created: (1) disparity in sentencing, (2) discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, level of education, and whether or not the
offense was a white-collar crime, and (3) inefficiency of rehabilita-
tion.124 In place of the indeterminate sentencing system, the re-
formers lobbied for a determinate sentencing system designed to
provide certainty and fundamental fairness for all.
25
Congress took heed of these educated complaints. 12 By 1975
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id at 252. Justice Rutledge also dissented, but did not write an opinion on his
vote and did not join in Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion. Id.
121. Id at 253.
122. Id at 252-53.
123. Ernest W. Schoellkopff, Ordering the Purposes of Sentencing: A Prologue to
Guidelines, 2 Notre Dame L Rev, Ethics and Pub Policy 503, 512 (1985-87). Judge Marvin
Frankel, a former law professor and United States District Judge for the Southern District
of New York, led this reform movement. See Marvin Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing,
41 U Cin L Rev 1 (1972), and Marvin Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order
(1973). The first major systematic critique of the indeterminate sentencing system was con-
ducted by the Working Party of American Friends Services Committee, vho wrote Struggle
For Justice in 1971 about the disparities in the California prison system. Shane-DuBow,
Brown and Olsen, Sentence Reform in the United States at 9 (cited in note 94).
124. Shane-DuBow, Brown and Olsen, Sentence Reform in the United States at 6
(cited in note 94).
125. Id.
126. As empirical studies on sentencing patterns continued to reiterate that rehabilita-
tion was not working to reduce the rate of recidivism, Congress became convinced that not
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Congress had introduced the first congressional bill to establish a
set of sentencing guidelines based upon determinate sentences.
12 7
The culmination of the criticism of the indeterminate sentencing
system was the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.128 The Act was en-
acted specifically for the purpose of solving the problems of dispar-
ity, discrimination, and excessive leniency, problems which Con-
gress determined were caused by indeterminate sentences and
unguided judicial discretion. 12 9 To combat these problems, the Act
established a United States Sentencing Commission (hereinafter
"Sentencing Commission"),'"0 which was charged with the duty of
developing a new sentencing system'' that was to provide cer-
tainty, fundamental fairness, and a structure for judicial
discretion. s2
enough was known about criminal behavior and how to rehabilitate criminals and thus reha-
bilitation should not be the prime focus of criminal sentencing. Rep No 225, 98th Cong, 1st
Sess 38-40, reprinted in US Code Cong & Admin News 3221-23 (1984).
127. S 2699, 94th Cong, 1st Sess, 121 Cong Rec 37, 563-64 (daily ed, Nov 20, 1975).
128. The Sentencing Reform Act was enacted as Chapter II of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, §§ 211-39, 98 Stat 1837, 1987 (1984), codified
in 18 USC §§ 3551-86, 3621-25, 3742 and 28 USC §§ 991-98 (1988). The Comprehensive
Crime Control Act was enacted in response to public concern over the rise in the rate of
drug use and distribution, violent crime and recidivism. Ogletree, 101 Harv L Rev at 1945
(cited in note 68).
129. Nagel, 80 J Crim L & Criminol at 883 (cited in note 67). The Act had, as its
foundation, the four traditional goals for sentencing: (1) retributive punishment, (2) deter-
rence, (3) incapacitation, and (4) rehabilitation. These goals are listed in 18 USC
§ 3553(a)(2). For the language of Section 3553(a)(2), see note 69.
130. Under the Act, the Commission was established as an independent agency of the
federal judicial branch. It consists of seven voting members and one ex officio, non-voting
member, either the Attorney General or his designee. Three members of the Commission
must be federal judges and no more than four of the Commissioners can be of the same
political party. 28 USC § 991(a) (1989).
131. When the Sentencing Commission first met in 1986, Minnesota, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania and Washington had already instituted sentencing guidelines and, therefore,
the Sentencing Commission had these examples available for consideration. Ogletree, 101
Harv L Rev at 1943 (cited in note 68).
132. 28 USC § 991(b) provides that the purposes of the Commission are to:
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system
that-
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2)
of title 18, United States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility
to permit individualized sentences warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not
taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices, and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior
as it relates to the criminal justice process; and
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and cor-
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In April of 1987, after conducting extensive public hearings, es-
tablishing a substantial research program, and meeting with a mul-
titude of criminal law authorities, the Sentencing Commission
presented the United States Sentencing Guidelines to Congress for
review.13 3 On November 1, 1987, the Guidelines became law.1
34
Judicial discretion was not eliminated under the Guidelines;
rather, it is more structured and limited. 135 A sentencing judge
must follow the Guidelines unless an atypical situation arises
where the facts of the case reveal a situation which the sentencing
judge thought the Commission had not addressed in the Guide-
lines.136 Then, if the defendant is sentenced outside of the Guide-
lines' range for the offense committed, the judge must state the
basis for his decision.'37 The sentence is then reviewable by the
appellate courts.'
38
The extent to which a judge's discretion in sentencing is limited
by the Guidelines can be seen by examining how a judge must deal
with recidivist offenders. 3" Where a defendant is a repeat offender,
the judge must turn to the Guidelines and determine whether,
under Sections 4B1.1 and 4131.2, the defendant qualifies as a "ca-
reer offender' 40 and, thus, must be subjected to a sentence en-
rectional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in
section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code.
28 USC § 991(b) (1989).
133. Guidelines, Chapter One, Part A(2).
134. Id.
135. For example, the Guidelines control the judge in his sentencing in that where the
Guidelines call for imprisonment, the maximum imprisonment length does not exceed the
minimum imprisonment length by more than twenty-five percent or six months. 28 USC
§ 994(b)(2) (1989). Moreover, the Guidelines must be neutral as to the race, sex national
origin, creed and social-economic status of offenders. 28 USC § 994(d) (1989).
136. 18 USC § 3553(b) (1989).
137. 18 USC § 3553(c)(2) (1989).
138. Where the sentence imposed is outside the Guidelines range for the criminal of-
fense committed, the appellate court may review the reasonableness of the departure. 18
USC § 3742 (1988). Where the sentence is within the range prescribed by the Guidelines,
the appellate court may still review the sentence to see if the Guidelines were properly
applied. Id.
139. It was Congress' intent when enacting the Sentencing Reform Act to impose
strict sentences for repeat offenders; Section 994(h) of title 28 mandated that the Commis-
sion, in dealing with "career offenders," ensure that the sentences imposed by judges be "at
or near the maximum term authorized under the Guidelines." 28 USC § 994(h) (1989). The
legislative history of Section 994(h) indicates that the phrase "maximum term authorized"
is to be construed to mean the maximum term authorized by statute. See S Rep 98-225,
98th Cong, 1st Sess (1982) ("Career Crimes" amendment No 13 by Senator Kennedy), 12796
(explanation of amendment) and 12798 (remarks by Senator Kennedy). Thomas H. Hutch-
inson and David Yellen, Federal Sentencing Law and Practice 316 (West, 1989).
140. For the definition of "career offender," see note 16 and accompanying text.
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hancement.141 The judge no longer can independently make such a
determination.
That the sentencing judge's discretion is not completely elimi-
nated, however, can be seen from comment three to Section 1B1.2
of the Guidelines. 42 In comment three, the Guidelines state that
there will be circumstances in which it will be appropriate for the
sentencing court to examine the actual conduct of the offender,
even though that conduct is not a statutory element of the
conviction. 43
The Guidelines were not at first accepted by the third circuit
federal courts.4 Like many of the federal courts throughout the
country, the third circuit courts questioned the constitutionality of
the Sentencing Reform Act. 45 As a result, until the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in Mis-
tretta v United States,46 the third circuit courts consistently held
141. A career offender's criminal history category will be a Category IV in every case.
Guidelines, § 4B1.1. It is this categorization which causes the significant enhancement of the
defendant's punishment. Id.
142. Comment three to Section 1B1.2 reads:
In many instances, it will be appropriate that the court consider the actual conduct of
the offender, even when such conduct does not constitute an element of the offense.
As described above, this may occur when an offender stipulates certain facts in a plea
agreement. It is more typically so when the court considers the applicability of spe-
cific offense characteristics within individual guidelines, when it considers various ad-
justments, and when it considers whether or not to depart from the guidelines for
reasons relating to offense conduct. See 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) and 4B1.4 (Infor-
mation to be Used in Imposing Sentence).
Guidelines, § 1B1.2.
143. Id.
144. See, for example, United States v Frank, 682 F Supp 815 (W D Pa 1988) (the
Sentencing Reform Act, by mandating that Article III judges serve on an executive commis-
sion and perform executive duties and functions, violates the separation of powers doctrine);
United States v Whyte, 694 F Supp 1194 (E D Pa 1988) (the Sentencing Reform Act and its
Guidelines violated the separation of powers doctrine by placing the Sentencing Commis-
sion in the judicial branch which has no authority to legislate or execute sentences binding
upon all judges); and United States v Brown, 690 F Supp 1423 (E D Pa 1988) (the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act, by locating the Sentencing Commission which was to promulgate sentenc-
ing guidelines within the judicial branch, violated constitutional separation of powers
doctrine).
145. See note 144 and accompanying next.
146. 488 US 361 (1989). In Mistretta, the issue was whether the Guidelines were un-
constitutional because the United States Sentencing Commission constituted both a viola-
tion of the separation of powers doctrine and an excessive delegation of authority by Con-
gress. Mistretta, 488 US at 370. The defendant, Mistretta, had been convicted in a Missouri
federal district court of one count of conspiracy and agreement to distribute cocaine in vio-
lation of 21 USC §§ 846 and 848(b)(1)(B). Id. The United States Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Blackmun, dismissed Mistretta's claim and accordingly upheld
the constitutionality of the Guidelines. Id at 412. Stating that while the Sentencing Coin-
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the Guidelines unconstitutional. 147 Therefore, the Third Circuit's
interpretations of the Guidelines' definition of a "crime of vio-
lence" are limited in number.
The first case in which the Third Circuit examined the definition
of a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines was United States v
Williams. 45 In Williams, the court faced the issue of whether the
possession of a gun by a convicted felon constituted a "crime of
violence" as that term was defined in Section 4B1.2(1) of the
Guidelines.1 49 The district court, in sentencing Williams, deter-
mined that the possession of a gun by a convicted felon was a
"crime of violence" under Section 4B1.2.150 Therefore, because the
defendant had been previously convicted of three "crimes of vio-
lence" under state law, the court sentenced him as a career
offender.' 5'
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment
of sentence, holding that Williams qualified as a career offender
under the Guidelines. 52 The Third Circuit so held on the basis of
the Application Note to Section 4B1.2, which stated in pertinent
part:
Other offenses are covered only if the conduct for which the defendant was
specifically convicted meets the above definition. For example, conviction
for an escape accomplished by force or threat of force would be covered;
conviction for an escape by stealth would not be covered."'3
The Third Circuit reasoned that, by analogy to the Application
Note's escape example, William's firing a gun at another while pos-
sessing it constituted a "crime of violence" under Section 4B1.2(1)
mission was "an unusual hybrid of structure and authority," it was constitutional in both
structure and effect. Id.
147. See note 144 and accompanying text.
148. 892 F2d 296 (3d Cir 1989).
149. Williams examined Section 4B1.2(1) prior to its amendment of November 1,
1989. At the time of Williams' conviction, Section 4B1.2 provided that a "crime of violence"
for purposes of sentencing was defined by 18 USC § 16. Section 16 defines a "crime of
violence" as:
The term "crime of violence" means-
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or
(b) by any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the
course of committing the offense.
18 USC § 16 (1989).
150. Williams, 892 F2d at 304.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id, citing Guidelines, § 4B1.2 commentary.
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of the Guidelines.15 4
Soon after the Third Circuit's decision in Williams, Section
4B1.2 and its definition of a "crime of violence" were amended.
155
The congressional intent underlying the modifications was the
clarification of what the term "crime of violence" meant under the
Guidelines. 151 Congress was dissatisfied with the inconsistent man-
ner in which the courts of appeals were interpreting the term.157
Specifically, the alteration of Section 4B1.2 was two-fold. First,
the amended section included a complete definition of the term
"crime of violence," one that was derived from Section 924(e) of
the Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986.158 Previous to the
amendment, Section 4B1.2(1) had only included a reference to the
definition of "crime of violence" used in Section 16 of the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 1984.159 Second, an explanation of
"crime of violence," as the term was used under Section 16 of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act, was deleted from the Applica-
tion Notes of Section 4B1.2. e° Inserted in its place was an expla-
nation of the Section's amended definition of a "crime of
violence."'161
154. Williams, 892 F2d at 304.
155. The changes made in the Guidelines were effective November 1, 1991.
156. United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual
556 (West, 1991).
157. In determining whether a crime was a "crime of violence," the Fifth, Sixth and
Seventh Circuits permitted consideration of underlying conduct. United States v Flores,
875 F2d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir 1989); United States v Maddalena, 893 F2d 815, 820 (6th Cir
1989); and United States v McNeal, 900 F2d 119, 122-23 (7th Cir 1990). The Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits did not allow consideration of underlying conduct. United States v
Becker, 919 F2d 568 (9th Cir 1990); United States v Selfa, 918 F2d 749 (9th Cir 1990);
United States v Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F2d 542, 547 (11th Cir 1990).
158. 18 USC § 924(e) provides a sentence enhancement for a defendant convicted
under 28 USC § 922(g) of unlawful possession of a firearm when the defendant has three
prior convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense or both. Section 924(e)(2)(B)
defines a violent felony as:
Any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that-
(i) has as an element that use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise in-
volves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
18 USC § 924(e) (1989).
159. The definition of "crime of violence" in 18 USC § 924(e) and 18 USC § 16 are the
same except that 18 USC § 16(a) includes the use of force against property in addition to
the use of force against persons. McAllister, 927 F2d at 138 n 2.
160. United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual
481 (West, 1990).




The Third Circuit examined Section 4B1.2(1)'s amended defini-
tion of a "crime of violence" in United States v McAllister.16 2 The
issue in McAllister was whether the defendant's two prior convic-
tions for robbery were "crimes of violence" under the Guide-
lines.16e McAllister had been convicted of a number of crimes,
three of which were "controlled substance offenses."'' 4 At the sen-
tencing hearing, the pre-sentence investigation report indicated
that McAllister had four prior adult convictions, two of which were
robberies. 165 McAllister requested that he not be sentenced as a
career offender. The sentencing judge agreed, stating that because
the facts of the predicate convictions were sufficiently ambigu-
ous,166 he could not say that both crimes were "crimes of violence"
as the term was meant in the Guidelines.
67
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the two robbery convic-
tions were per se "crimes of violence" and thus McAllister should
have been treated as a career offender for sentencing purposes. 16 8
The court's holding was chiefly predicated upon: (1) Section
4B1.2(1)(i) of the Guidelines, which provided that a "crime of vio-
lence" means any offense, either under federal or state law, punish-
able by imprisonment for more than one year that has as an ele-
ment of the offense the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, and (2) Application
Note 2 to Section 4B1.2, which expressly stated that robbery was a
"crime of violence.' 6 9
The court also acknowledged that such a categorical approach to
determining whether a prior crime was a "crime of violence" under
162. 927 F2d 136 (3d Cir 1991).
163. McAllister, 927 F2d at 138.
164. Id at 137. For the Guidelines' definition of "controlled substance offense," see
note 8.
165. McAllister, 927 F2d at 137. Concerning the robberies, the investigation record
revealed that: (1) in the first robbery the defendant had stolen $190 from a female victim by
grabbing her arm and taking the money from her, and (2) in the second robbery, McAllister
and two other individuals had attacked a gentleman and stolen his wallet. Id. In describing
the first robbery, the report indicated that a weapon had not been used in perpetrating the
crime; there was no mention of use of weapons in the description of the second robbery. Id.
166. See note 165 and accompanying text.
167. McAllister, 927 F2d at 137-38.
168. Id at 138-39.
169. Id at 138. The court also noted the significance of Application note 3 to Section
4B1.2, which provided that "a prior felony conviction" was a federal or state conviction for a
crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year, irrespective of whether




Section 4B1.2 might not always be possible. 70 Therefore, the court
suggested that a more detailed factual inquiry might be necessary
when the offense in question is not specifically listed as a "crime of
violence" in the Application Notes to Section 4B1.2.'
Because, as amended, Section 4B1.2(1) adopted a definition of
"crime of violence" derived from Section 924(e) of the Career
Criminals Amendment Act of 1986,171 it is necessary to examine
how the definition, termed a "violent felony" under Section 924(e),
has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. The
most recent analysis of the section is found in the Supreme Court's
decision in Taylor v United States.
1
73
In Taylor, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,17 4 ex-
amined the issue of whether a defendant's prior burglary convic-
tions were "violent felonies" as the term "burglary" was used in
Section 924(e) of the Career Criminals Amendment Act.1"7 The de-
fendant argued that his two burglary convictions were not "violent
felonies" because the burglary convictions did not, as required in
Section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), involve conduct that presented a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.
17 6
In analyzing the issue, the Supreme Court first examined what
elements Congress meant to include in the term "burglary."1  The
Court held that Congress, in enacting Section 924(e), had intended
"burglary" to be used in the modern generic sense, similar to its
use in the majority of the states' criminal codes.1 78 Consequently,
170. Id at 139.
171. Id. In support of this proposition, the court cited Williams, 892 F2d at 303-04
(see note 142 and accompanying text); United States v Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F2d 542, 547-
48 (11th Cir 1990); and United States v Brunson, 907 F2d 117, 120-21 (10th Cir 1990).
McAllister, 927 F2d at 139.
172. See note 158 and accompanying text.
173. 495 US 575 (1990).
174. Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor and Kennedy. Justice Scalia joined in all but
Part II of the opinion, which dealt with the legislative history of Section 924(e). Taylor, 495
US at 575. Justice Scalia issued an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment. His concurrence essentially stated that the Court should not have devoted ten pages
of the opinion to the legislative history of Section 924(e) after having held that the term
"burglary," as used in the statute, had a contemporary plain meaning which was to be given
effect and which was not to be modified by the rule of lenity. Id at 602-03.
175. For the definition of "violent felony," see note 158.
176. Section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) provides that "violent felony" "means any crime punisha-
ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that-
(ii) is burglary. . .or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another." 18 USC § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (1989).
177. Taylor, 495 US at 577.
178. Id at 599. The elements of a "generic" burglary are unlawful or unprivileged en-
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the Court concluded that a defendant should be viewed as having
been convicted of "burglary," as the term is used in Section 924(e),
if either: (1) the offense's statutory definition substantially corre-
sponded to the "generic" burglary offense,17e or (2) the charging
paper and the jury instructions for the prior offense actually re-
quired the jury to find all of the elements of a "generic" burglary
in order to convict the defendant.180
In holding that the term "burglary" was to be construed in its
modern "generic" sense, the Court based its reasoning on the legis-
lative history of Section 924(e).' 8 ' The Court reasoned that from
the section's legislative history,18 2 it was clear that Congress' intent
was that a categorical approach to "burglary" be used by the
courts and that the category encompass the generic elements of
burglary.183 Specifically, the Court stated that the section's legisla-
try into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime. Id.
179. Id at 602.
180. Id. In reference to Taylor's specific case, because not all of the Missouri burglary
statutes in existence at the time of Taylor's conviction included the requisite generic bur-
glary elements listed by the Court, the Court ordered a remand for further determinations
consistent with the Court's opinion. Id.
181. Id at 581-88.
182. The legislative history of Section 924(e) indicated that Congress enacted the first
version of the sentence enhancement provision in 1984 and that the provision contained a
definition of "burglary." In 1986, the provision was recodified at 18 USC § 924(e); at that
time, the provision's definition was slightly amended. The sentence enhancement provision
was amended again five months later. This amendment is the present form of Section
924(e). The amendment made three changes: (1) the list of predicate offenses which quali-
fied as "violent felonies" was expanded from "robbery or burglary" to "a violent felony or a
serious drug offense," (2) the provision defined "violent felony" to include burglary, and (3)
the pre-existing definition of burglary was deleted. Id at 582.
183. In determining that Congress meant "burglary" in Section 924(e) to mean bur-
glary in its generic sense, the Court dismissed the Eighth Circuit's reasoning that Congress
intended the meaning of burglary for the purposes of Section 924(e) to depend on the defi-
nition of burglary adopted by the state of conviction. Id at 590. In dismissing this analysis,
the Court asserted that such an analysis could not be accurate because its application would
lead to arbitrary results and the purpose of the Guidelines was to provide uniformity in
sentencing. Id at 591. To illustrate this point, the Court explained that under the Eighth
Circuit's analysis, whether or not a person would receive a sentencing enhancement would
depend solely on whether his prior criminal conduct was termed a "burglary" under state
law. Id.
The Court also dismissed the argument used by some of the courts of appeals that Con-
gress intended the uniform definition of "burglary" in Section 924(e) to refer to burglaries
involving the elements of common law burglaries. Id at 594. It dismissed this theory on the
ground that the modern understanding of "burglary" had so far diverged from its common
law roots that to adopt this categorical approach would prevent many of the repeat offend-
ers who should be given sentencing enhancement under Section 924(e) from so being given
and thus the purpose of the provision would largely be nullified. Id. To illustrate, the Court
noted that many state statutes had expanded their definitions of "burglary" to include en-
try, without breaking, into structures other than dwellings and entry with intent to commit
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tive history indicated that, while the amendment to Section 924(e)
was enacted to expand the coverage of the Act, the definition of
"burglary" was to be left as it existed prior to the amendment.18 4
Therefore, the Court concluded that because there was nothing in
the legislative history to show that Congress was dissatisfied with
its "generic" definition of burglary, and much in that history to
support the position that Congress was satisfied with its pre-ex-
isting definition, the deletion of the definition in the amendment
was a mere inadvertent error in the drafting process. 185 The preex-
isting definition was still to be utilized by the courts when examin-
ing predicate offenses.""8
Having established the proper construction of "burglary" as the
term was used in Section 924(e), the Court in Taylor next turned
to the question of whether, in applying Section 924(e), a sentenc-
ing court could look only to the statutory definition of the prior
burglary offense or, alternatively, whether a court could look to the
particular facts underlying the offense.18 7 The Court held that,
generally, a sentencing court could look only to the statutory defi-
nition of the prior offense and not to the underlying facts of the
a crime other than a felony. Id at 593. The Court concluded its dismissal by stating that,
absent a specific indication of congressional intent, it was the Court's policy not to adopt a
definition which it believed was so ill-suited to a statute's purpose. Id at 594.
Lastly, the Court dismissed Taylor's theory that Congress intended "burglary" in Section
924(e) to mean only those burglaries which elements for conviction included "conduct that
presents a serious risk of physical injury to another." Id at 597. The Court stated that such
a conclusion would be illogical because if it had been Congress' intent, there was no reason
to specifically add the word "burglary" to Section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) since the provision al-
ready included any offense which "involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another." Id. Furthermore, the Court made note of the fact that the pro-
vision used the unqualified language "is burglary" and stated that, had Congress intended
to include only certain burglaries as predicate offenses, it would not have chosen such une-
quivocable language. Id.
184. Id. Senator Specter, who introduced Senate Bill 2312, stated that "since the en-
hancement provision had been in effect for a year and a half, and 'has been successful with
the basic classification of robberies and burglaries as the definition for 'career criminal,' the
time has come to broaden that definition so that we may have greater sweep and more
effective use of this important statute.'" 132 Cong Rec 7697 (1986).
185. Taylor, 495 US at 589-90.
186. Id at 590.
187. Id at 602. The Court examined this issue because it acknowledged that while
there was no difficulty in applying Section 924(e) when the state statute's definition of "bur-
glary" was narrower than the generic view of burglary (in that conviction under the state
statute necessarily implied that the defendant had been deemed to have committed all the
elements of generic "burglary"), it perceived that problems could arise when the state stat-
ute under which the defendant was convicted varied substantially from the generic defini-
tion. Id at 599-600.
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burglary.188 The Court based its conclusion upon the grounds that:
(1) the language of Section 924(e) suggested that Congress' intent
was that the sentencing court, when looking at burglary convic-
tions, restrict its examination solely to the fact of conviction, (2)
the legislative history of Section 924(e) revealed that Congress gen-
erally took a categorical approach to predicate offenses, and (3) al-
lowing a factual inquiry presented practical difficulties and the
possibility of unfairness because the sentencing court would, in
fact, have to conduct a mini-trial before imposing sentence.18 The
Court completed its analysis by stating that the only exception to
this general rule concerning burglary was when the state statute
was non-generic and a jury actually was required to find all the
elements of generic burglary.190
The Third Circuit's conclusion in United States v John was
that, in determining the existence vel non of a "crime of violence"
as a predicate to career offender status under the Guidelines, a
sentencing court could inquire into the actual facts underlying a
prior conviction to determine whether it "present[ed] a serious po-
tential risk of physical injury to another."'191 Such a conclusion was
not revolutionary; it is consistent with the precedent established
by the Third Circuit in United States v Williams 92 and United
States v McAllister. 93 It is also consistent with the decision of the
Supreme Court in United States v Taylor'94 because the Court, in
footnote nine of Taylor, stated that its holding in the case did not
prevent prosecutors from arguing that any prior crime, including
offenses similar to generic burglary, was a "crime of violence" be-
cause it "involved conduct that present[ed] a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another."' 95
Moreover, the Third Circuit's conclusion was fully in accord with
the reasons why Congress enacted the Guidelines, namely to elimi-
188. Id at 602. Significantly, the Court in a footnote to this analysis stated:
Our present concern is only to determine what offenses should count as "burglaries"
for enhancement purposes. The Government remains free to argue that any of-
fense-including offenses similar to generic burglary-should count towards enhance-
ment as one that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another" under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
John, 936 F2d at 769 n 9.
189. Taylor, 495 US at 600-01.
190. Id at 602.
191. John, 936 F2d at 770.
192. For discussion of Williams, see notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
193. For discussion of McAllister, see notes 162-71 and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of Taylor, see notes 173-90 and accompanying text.
195. John, 936 F2d at 769 n 9. See note 188.
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nate disparity, discrimination, and excessive leniency in sentencing
and to provide certainty and fairness in place thereof.'96 By exam-
ining underlying conduct, defendants with similar criminal histo-
ries who were convicted of the same crime will be sentenced for
similar periods of incarceration. Recidivist offenders will be unable
to escape "career offender" status merely because they had been
able, earlier in their criminal careers, to negotiate for a lesser con-
viction in exchange for a guilty plea or because the prosecution had
settled for a lesser conviction. Lastly, allowing an examination of a
defendant's actual conduct in prior crimes furthers Congress' man-
date to the Sentencing Commission that the Commission was to
ensure that repeat offenders be sentenced at or near the maximum
term possible when the defendant had: (1) been convicted of a
"crime of violence" and (2) previously been convicted of at least
two felonious "crimes of violence.'
197
Merely because the Third Circuit correctly applied the existing
law, however, does not mean that Section 4B1.2 is without fault.
Specifically, Application Note 2 to Section 4B1.2, which allegedly
explains how a sentencing court is to determine whether a prior
crime is a "crime of violence" for sentencing purposes, is wholly
inadequate. 98 Therefore, a critique of Application Note 2 must be
made.
As stated, one of the purposes of the November 1, 1989 amend-
ment to Application Note 2 of Section 4B1.2 was to clarify the def-
inition of a "crime of violence."' 9 Yet, when the Sentencing Com-
mission deleted the examples of what offenses were to be construed
as "crimes of violence" without further explaining what the Com-
mission meant by "[o]ther offenses are [crimes of violence] . . .
where . . . the conduct . . . by its nature, present[ed] a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another," the Sentencing Com-
mission failed in its attempt to clarify the term. Rather, it made
the understanding of what is a "crime of violence" even more am-
biguous. This constitutes a problem because: (1) the law is clear
that the commentary accompanying a Guideline's provision, which
includes application notes, must be considered in interpreting the
provision, 2°° and (2) one of Congress' main goals in enacting the
196. 28 USC § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988). See note 132.
197. 28 USC § 994(h) (1988).
198. For the language of Application note 2, see note 30.
199. See note 156 and accompanying text.
200. Guidelines, Chap 1 Part 1, intro, I et seq. See also United States v Anderson, 942
F2d 606 (9th Cir 1991), and United States v White, 888 F2d 490, 497 (7th Cir 1990).
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Guidelines was to create a uniform sentencing system and the defi-
nition in Section 4B1.2 is not being applied consistently.20'
Evidence that Application Note 2 has failed to clarify which
predicate offenses are to be considered a "crime of violence" can be
seen in the few cases decided by the other federal courts of ap-
peals20 2 under the November 1, 1989 amendments to the "Career
Offender" section of the Guidelines. 203 For example, the Eighth
Circuit in United States v Cornelius20 1 agreed with the Third Cir-
cuit's holding in John that Section 4B1.2 and Application Note 2
allowed a sentencing court to look beyond the statutory elements
of the prior offense to the underlying facts of the crime to deter-
mine whether it constituted a "crime of violence. 2 0 5 Conversely, in
United States v Walker,0 6 the Tenth Circuit, while interpreting
Section 4B1.2 and Application Note 2 to mean that a sentencing
court could examine a defendant's conduct to determine whether
the contemporary offense was a "crime of violence, ' '20 inferred
that a sentencing court could not examine the underlying facts of a
defendant's conduct when attempting to determine whether prior
offenses qualified a defendant as a "career offender" for sentencing
purposes. 208 The Tenth Circuit seemed to conclude that, when ex-
amining prior crimes, a sentencing court was restricted to taking a
categorical approach and to looking solely to the statutory ele-
ments of a prior offense.20 9
201. See footnote 132 and accompanying text.
202. Several district courts have also recently examined Section 4B1.2 and Application
Note 2. See United States v Tidswell, 767 F Supp 11, 15 (D Me 1991) (a sentencing court
must examine a defendant's underlying conduct to determine whether his conviction for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is a "crime of violence"); United States v Coble,
756 F Supp 470, 474 (E D Wash 1991) (the law is clear that when determining whether a
prior conviction is a "crime of violence" the nature of the offense is to be the determining
factor, not the underlying facts of the crime; however, when determining whether the in-
stant offense is a "crime of violence," a court may look at the defendant's underlying con-
duct); and United States v Hernandez, 753 F Supp 1191, 1198 (S D NY 1990) (Section
4B1.2 and its Application Note 2 compel a holding that a sentencing court is confined to
examining the charged conduct and not the underlying facts of that conduct).
203. Significantly, all of the circuit courts of appeals cases which were cited by the
Third Circuit in the instant case as being ir accord with its holding were decided by apply-
ing the "crime of violence" definition of 18 USC § 16. See note 41 and accompanying text.
204. 931 F2d 490 (8th Cir 1991).
205. "We . . . hold that courts should look beyond the mere statutory elements of a
crime when determining whether an offense is a crime of violence." Cornelius, 931 F2d at
493.
206. 930 F2d 789 (10th Cir 1991).
207. Walker, 930 F2d at 793.




Consequently, by not properly clarifying what offenses are to be
considered "crimes of violence" for sentencing enhancement pur-
poses, the Sentencing Commission has created a situation where
uniformity in sentencing will not prevail. As the above cases reveal,
a defendant's fate in front of a sentencing court apparently can
differ depending upon the federal circuit in which he had been
convicted.
Indeed, John presented a perfect example of the problem the
Sentencing Commission created with Application Note 2. It ap-
pears that had John been convicted in the Tenth Circuit, the sen-
tencing court, under Walker, would have been limited to examin-
ing the statutory elements of the crime charged. Therefore, since
grand larceny inherently does not have as an element "a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another," John would not have
been sentenced as a career offender and his sentence would not
have been elevated.
To permit such disparity is to ignore the impetus behind Con-
gress' enactment of the sentencing reforms;210 allowing these goals
to be so easily circumvented based on how a particular circuit in-
terprets Section 4B1.2 and its Application Note is contrary to the
spirit of the Guidelines.21 Therefore, the Sentencing Commission
needs to once again reexamine Application Note 2 to Section 4B1.2
and truly clarify the meaning of the term "crime of violence." The
sentencing of career offenders is too important to allow such ambi-
guity to continue.
Barbara A. Fisfis
210. See note 129 and accompanying text.
211. See note 132 and accompanying text.
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